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ABSTRACT: This article addresses the complementarity between social policy and 
pro-growth macroeconomic policies, which turned redistribution into a crucial issue 
to consolidate market societies through the expansion of demand. It focuses on the 
recent economic history of Latin America, marked by the emergence of new concep-
tual paradigms so as to grasp the singularities of the region´s development. Three 
questions are then raised: i) which social inclusion model distinguishes the new period 
of economic growth led by the so called social-developmentalist strategies? ii) what 
role is assigned to the social protection system and to social policies in general in this 
context? iii) which mechanisms enabled the transition towards a mass-consumption 
society? Brazil will serve as a case study.
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POLÍTICA SOCIAL E HETEROGENEIDADE 
ESTRUTURAL NA AMÉRICA LATINA: 
A VIRADA DO SÉCULO XXI
RESUMO: Esse artigo examinaa complementariedade entre política social e políticas 
macroeconômicas pró-crescimento, tornando a redistribuição um fator dinâmico na 
consolidação de sociedades de mercado apoiadas na expansão da demanda. Analisa 
o período recente da história econômica latino-americana, marcado pelo surgimento 
de paradigmas conceituais voltados a explicar as especificidades do desenvolvimento 
da região. Três questões são abordadas no trabalho: i) que modelo de inclusão social 
caracteriza a nova fase de crescimento liderada pelas chamadas estratégias desenvolvi-
mentistas?; ii) qual o papel atribuído ao sistema de proteção social e à política social 
lato sensu nesta dinâmica?; e iii) que mecanismos serviram para assegurar a transição a 
uma sociedade de consumo de massa? O Brasil é tomado como estudo de caso.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: política social; desigualdade; América Latina; estruturalismo.
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The growing dissemination of modern products in Latin America in no way chan-
ges the weakness of the traditional social relations into which these objects are in-
corporated. How modern a society is has less to do with the objects that are dissemi-
nated within it than with the modernness of its institutions and of the relationships 
on which the design, acquisition, selection, and evaluation of the usefulness of those 
objects are based. (FAJNZYLBER, 1990, p.162)
1. INTRODUCTION
In their correspondence, especially in the year of 1942, Beveridge and Keynes (HAR-
RIS, 1997) forged a partnership that would prove successful over the course of the 
20th century, as they contributed reciprocally to the design and theoretical foundations 
of what would become the model for social regulation par excellence of the Fordist 
accumulation regime, envisioning not simply its complementarity, but rather its ef-
ficiency in stemming uncertainty and economic instability, both being sources of deep 
socioeconomic insecurity for familiesand individuals, and threats to the system itself.
The Keynesian welfare state (JESSOP, 1993) was an exceptional innovation, with 
its logic rooted in the disassociation between individual welfare and revenue from 
work or assets, so as to maintain aggregate demand at a satisfactory level, in periods 
of shrinking economic activity, and allow for permanent expansion. A minimum level 
of income should thus be guaranteed for all, independently of the value of one’s work 
or properties, and it would fall to the state to determine such a level, in addition to the 
principal responsibility of guaranteeing that all citizens, regardless of class or status, 
have access to the best possible standard in an array of services judged to be indispens-
able (BRIGGS,1961).
For the first time, a model emerges in which social policy is recognized as insepa-
rable from economic policy, and thus an essential instrument in the state’s promot-
ing of economic development (SIMÕES, 2012). In the words of Donzelot (1994, apud 
PALIER 2002, p.194), there emerges a “circular mechanism” characterized by bonds of 
cooperation and systemic strengthening of the regime of accumulation, not by subor-
dination of the social element to the economic.
We may concisely define this model of regulation via the privileged role granted to 
social spending, in both sustaining consumption and incentivizing direct job creation. 
According to Palier (2002), the former use meets the consumption needs of the popu-
lation (seniors and retired people, the poor, unemployed, and children through univer-
sal benefits, etc.) via cash transfers. Itensures increasingly dynamic market expansion 
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in times of growth, and may constitute a countercyclical measure during downturns in 
the cycle. The latter use of social spending uses the provision of universal and decom-
modified or partially subsidized public services to create jobs in a number of sectors 
(healthcare, education, daycare, transportation, etc.), which is key in terms of raising 
work productivity, ideally disseminating this rise throughout the whole system. This 
job creation, one might add, is not only confined to the public sector in terms of di-
rect provision, but also impacts many industrial sectors (pharmaceuticals and R&D, to 
name a few) that supply the public sector.
This model sought to insert the market into the political and social organization 
of nations (POLAYNI, 1944). In other words, the expansion of markets in the postwar 
period was dictated by the actions of political institutions (national states, in this case) 
and social institutions (mainly unions and the new regulatory forms adopted within 
social protection systems). This resulted in the formation of development models that 
reserved a significant portion of the fruits of economic growth for the population 
 itself.
This led to the emergence of various formats of welfare states, all characterized 
by decommodification (POLANYI, 1944) of the workforce so as to ensure its rela-
tive emancipation vis-à-vis the market. Decommodification and deindividualization 
(ROSANVALLON, 2011) were thus the two driving forces in market societies. Their 
extraordinary expansion came alongside a striking reduction in levels of inequality 
and destitution, in addition to consolidating democratic institutions aimed at heading 
off risks and uncertainties by ensuring welfare, economic security, and growing social 
homogenization.
In order to face down the destabilizing machine of expanding capitalism, a form of 
social regulation with the following essential premises comes to the fore:
i. equal treatment: it overcomes class or status cleavages, making citizenship the 
foundation for universal access – policies for all [or, in the words of Beveridge, 
(1942, p.44 ), “a plan all-embracing in scope of persons and needs”];
ii. the end of the social service state: the welfare state is no longer limited, as it 
once was (at the time of the Poor Laws or within the limits imposed by the Bis-
marckian model), to providing a restricted array of services to a specific sector 
of the population, identified by criteria established a priori;
iii. coverage in keeping with contingencies and needs: instead of minimum social 
standards at a survival level, as in the past, the state is tasked with ensuring 
protection over the entire life cycle, and guaranteeing a standard of wellbeing 
compatible with and befitting economic development and its evolution. Hence, 
rights cannot be circumscribed in “packages.”
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Two separate modes of social policy, with specific objectives, spread during post-
war period in the western economies that were able to install welfare states. They make 
up one of the poles of the double movement (POLANYI, 1944) inherent in the develop-
ment of capitalism. On one side, cash transfers (contributory or noncontributory); on 
the other, the provision of decommodified services. While the former would seek to 
compensate for market failures and smooth consumption over the course of one’s life, 
an array of services in terms of healthcare, education, and housing aimed at leveling 
out opportunities (BARR, 2012) and promoting equity.
In Latin America, meanwhile, social protection systems were shaped from their 
start by a regional context of great heterogeneity, although the region was a pioneer in 
introducing social security programs in the early 20th century, compared to other con-
tinents in the underdeveloped world (MESA-LAGO, 2007). These systems remained 
incomplete and unrefined, and although the principle of universality was referred to 
in a very few countries (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica), none would at-
tain universal coverage until the 1970s. In the rest, the idea of protection remained 
embryonic and was nearly always the privilege of the elites in the public sector and the 
military, as well as sectors linked directly to the agro-export model. As for noncon-
tributory benefits (for the poorest), the extremely limited offering failed to crystallize 
as a right or a state responsibility, and remained restricted, when available, to a very 
limited group of countries. The better part of the region – with its high levels of infor-
mality, low rate of wage employment and the predominance of the effective exclusion 
of rural and indigenous populations from contributory systems, in many cases – saw 
starkly reduced coverage.
Such characteristics on their own point to the fragile, nearly nonexistent link be-
tween social and economic policy, a state of affairs that predominated over the course 
of the second phase of Latin American state-led industrialization, commonly referred 
to as the first wave of developmentalism, with strikingly varied effects across the 
countries on the continent (BERTOLA and OCAMPO, 2012). While the national-
developmentalist state managed to promote a process of capitalist modernization and 
support for the new urban industrial proletariat after World War II, it did not manage 
to incorporate the mass of workers on the margin of this new regime of accumulation, 
marked by wage relations. These masses thus remained largely set apart from incor-
poration into the market.
The 21st century seems to have finally enshrined a new framework in Latin  America 
for social and economic policy, leading to the advent of mass consumption societies. 
This phenomenon is made even more relevant by the fact that one of the obstacles to 
economic and social development in Latin America, in a structuralist vision, lay in 
the lack of a vigorous domestic market which might, through an import-substitution 
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process, push an increase in industrial productivity and a subsequent rise in average 
salary. Therefore, it would endanger a virtuous and permanent cycle of production 
and demand expansion, founded on a dynamic of innovation that might constantly 
refine the consumption patterns of a mass society.
Residual conditional cash transfers and microcredit programs, alongside specific 
forms of social regulation, such as the minimum wage, have shown themselves to be, if 
not completely functional, then at least contemporary with this new “developmentalist 
strategy,” one which has finally discovered social policy. Latin America is recognized 
today for its success in having incorporated tens of millions of individuals into the 
consumer market in the span of a few years, while contributing to their social inclu-
sion, a feat which stands as extraordinary in the light of the continent’s history.
What did structuralist thinking cast as a hindrance to the defense and construction 
of social policies? What was the prevailing model of social regulation, redistribution, 
or framework for incorporating social and economic policy in the administrations 
that chose to return to a structuralist mode at the turn of this century? If, as Bertola 
and Ocampo (2012) indicate, Latin America failed to maintain a trajectory of sustain-
able growth over the course of the 20th century so as to reduce the gap that sets it apart 
from developed countries in countless respects, might the state’s structuralist-driven 
perspective, with its exclusive focus on economic policy (and with a key emphasis on 
industrial expansion), have compromised that effort through its inability to associate 
and coordinate economic and social policy in search of a sustainable dynamic?
A number of authors (BIELSCHOWSKY, 2010, 2012; BRESSER-PEREIRA, 
2012, BRESSER-PEREIRA and THEUER, 2012; CARNEIRO, 2012; CEPEDA, 2012; 
and BASTOS, 2012) has recognized the resurgence of Latin American structuralist 
thought in the void left by mediocre performance over the neoliberal era. And, just 
as happened in post-WWII, this turning point has come about amidst a keen cri-
sis in central economies (CARNEIRO, 2012). The state resumes a leadership role in 
formulating a national project for development meant to overcome the bottlenecks 
that continue to block technical advancement, innovation, productive diversification, 
but now tied to a plan for social inclusion. This would thus be the differential for 
social-developmentalism (CARNEIRO, 2012), or, as Bastos (2012, p.793) puts it, “dis-
tributive developmentalism guided by the state,” vis-à-vis the seminal structuralist 
thought: renewed attention on social issues and equity as a constitutive part of the 
new model of developmentalism, this time included amongst the priorities for state 
action.
In this article, we will examine whether (and how, and in what form) social  policy 
has indeed become a prime, indissociable element of macroeconomic strategies 
around a return to economic growth on stable, sustainable bases, making redistribu-
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tion a dynamic factor in the consolidation of market societies around the expansion of 
demand. Three issues run through the paper:
1. what model of social inclusion currently holds sway in this new phase of so-
called developmentalist strategies?
2. what role is attributed to the social protection system and social policy lato 
sensu in this dynamic?
3. how do economic and social policy fit together in the context of the growth and 
expansion of the market society?
The article is divided into five parts. After this introduction, it will recapitulate 
the conception of the social element in original structuralist thinking. The third sec-
tion addresses the first return to social policy in the CEPAL-driven formulation of the 
1990s, in which the idea of social inclusion first appears, seeking to evaluate whether 
this point indeed constitutes a reflexive relation between social and economic policy. 
In the fourth section, there follows an analysis of the content of social policy and its 
rationale in Latin America’s latest phase of growth, taking Brazil as an illustrative case. 
Finally, a few conclusions close out the article, addressing the questions formulated 
around the permanence (or lack thereof) of a missing link in the reflexivity of social 
policy as a driver of demand in this new phase of development. The objective is to re-
flect on the prevailing model of social regulation, and consider whether it strengthens 
universalist principles with the power to make more egalitarian societies possible on 
our continent.
2. THE PLACE OF THE SOCIAL IN ORIGINAL STRUCTURALIST THOUGHT
Original structuralist thought is, in its essence, not simply a critical alternative to or-
thodox liberal thought in economy, but rather, principally, a catching-up strategy. In 
this sense, it casts the state as the driver behind the transformation of the archaic pro-
ductive structures inadequate to the expansion of capitalism in the developing world, 
which reproduces asymmetries between the center and the periphery, reproducing 
underdevelopment (FURTADO, 2013a, 2013b; PREBISCH, 1949), exacerbating in-
equalities between industrialized nations and the rest of the world and hamstringing 
the advance of market societies2.
2 As Bertola and Ocampo (2012) have demonstrated, the gap in per capita income between Latin America 
and developed countries only increased from 1950 to 2008. 
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Latin American structuralism forges a strategy to reduce such inequalities, ques-
tioning the place set aside for the periphery (the Ricardian model of comparative ad-
vantages and criticism of Joseph Viner’s theory of economic development) through 
the structural transformation of the economy from agro-export to an urban-industrial 
base (BIELSCHOWSKY, 2012).
In this context, which prevailed immediately after the Second World War through 
the end of the 1980s, the goal was to overcome two dimensions of backwardness (the 
productive specialization of the periphery and its profound structural heterogeneity) 
through planned state interventions, thereby strengthening an institutional context 
(BERTOLA and OCAMPO, 2012; BIELSCHOWSKY, 2009) that had received little 
stimulus for innovation and the dissemination of technical advancement.
The most complete formulation on the challenges of the social from the initial 
construction of Latin American structuralist thought may perhaps be found in Aníbal 
Pinto’s (2000 [1970]) classic works on the region’s structural heterogeneity3, one of 
the great obstacles to the full development of productive forces and capitalist social 
relations. Structural heterogeneity here refers to the “coexistence of a labor force em-
ployed with elevated levels of productivity (not far from those of the great centers), 
and ‘normal’ levels (that is, at the rate permitted by available techniques), with a labor 
force of sharply reduced productivity,” (RODRÍGUEZ, 2009, p.323). This latter group 
poorly paid or paid at subsistence wages, leading to the persistence of structural un-
deremployment (elastic labor supply), restricting the growth of the wage bill, which in 
turn impedes a rise in employment and salaries and tends to concentrate income in 
the most productive sectors, with extremely limited scope and magnitude. It should be 
emphasized that structural heterogeneity concerns not only employment, but also the 
productive structure itself. In Rodríguez’s words:
the image before us is that of economies that see their growth limited, if not imped ed, 
by repeated shortfalls in the expansion of demand for various kinds of consumer 
goods, which may be decisively related to income distribution profiles marked by 
high concentration, this linked to the superabundance of labor and consequent li-
mitations on rising salaries. (2009, p.319)
From this angle, the impediment to the advancement of market societies in Latin 
America lay above all in the absence of mechanisms for expanding consumption, it 
being constrained by low productivity and the persistent abundance of labor that 
3 According to Octavio Rodríguez, the seminal concept was first formulated by Prebisch in his 1948 mani-
festo (Heterogeneidad Estructural y Empleo, Revista de la CEPAL, special number, 1970).
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is rudimentary from a technical point of view. In other words, “the dynamic action 
[that] operates on the supply side as well as around demand for final consumer goods” 
(FURTADO, 2013a, p.118) was not materializing.
Pinto, in refuting dualist theses4, recognizes that in central postwar economies, the 
long-term tendency towards the homogenization of the system through the conver-
gence of productivity levels across sectors was not exclusively the product of market 
forces or economic policies, but was driven by social policies as well5. In his words, 
this convergence was not “a totally spontaneous or natural tendency” (PINTO, 2000 
[1970], p.574).
Pinto points out that the “capacity to spread or stimulate the modern sector was 
revealed [in Latin America] to be far less than expected, to say the least” (PINTO, 2000 
[1970], p.575), leading to a deepening of theheterogeneity degree, instead of promot-
ing the homogenization of the global structure. By doing so, Pinto observes that public 
spending and social investments, that might have compensated by pulling resources 
from the modern sector to those left on the margins of the benefits of economic growth 
(the internal periphery, marginalized groups, etc.), did not come through. That is to 
say, social policy was not integrated into the original structuralist framework, which 
quite probably strengthened the model’s concentration-oriented deviations, while it 
expanded through “sumptuary” consumption (PINTO, 2000 [1970], p.583) guaran-
teed to the elites and upper middle classes. The author estimates that, by the late 1960s, 
40-50% of the population on the continent were marginalized or not incorporated into 
the market, excluded in terms of both consumption and occupation6. The reproduc-
tion of internal peripheries reproduced the subsistence logic without breaking with it, 
thus compromising the generation of surpluses.
Indeed, original structuralist thought did not press on with its reflection around 
the need to construct social protection systems as a central element in overcoming 
the structural heterogeneity characteristic of Latin American economies. What was 
concretely observed was subordinating social security models created over the first 
three decades of the 20th century to structuralism’s mold, in response to the process of 
economic modernization that served to shift the axis of capital accumulation towards 
4 Given our focus on the CEPAL school of thought, we have deliberately not introduced Francisco de 
Oliveira’s lucid, constructive, and vigorous critique of dualist thinking.
5 See, on this, Simões (2012), who describes in his thesis, using Polanyi’s contribution, how economic 
policy is successfully molded to social policy without dominating it. Due to a lack of space, this point 
cannot be developed here. 
6 In Brazil, as Dedecca (2005) has argued, the absence of social policies that might provide the foundation 
for solid economic growth in the period largely led to the segmentation of the Brazilian labor market, 
characterized by high levels of informality and by an excess of labor, factors that were apparently respon-
sible for the “wretched income distribution associated to that development process” (p.101).
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urban-industrial activities. These models proved incapable of fomenting greater social 
cohesion and homogeneity.
In broad strokes, the Latin American countries quickest to introduce social pro-
tection systems did so in two ways. One path was the result of the democratization 
of political institutions, in which the growing bargaining power of the working class 
drove the construction of pension and healthcare systems, in a few cases covering the 
portion of the population outside the labor market. This process was most intense in 
Uruguay – slightly less so in Chile – where the demands of the large working class 
found support in a democratic government committed to social development (HU-
BER and STEPHENS, 2012).
The second form, more present in the Brazilian and Argentine cases, saw social 
policies used to coopt the working class, which was exerting pressure on the authori-
tarian administrations of Vargas and Perón. Through labor legislation (MESA-LAGO, 
2007), centralization of the control and management of the pension system and con-
trol of unions and political parties, the populist governments of these two countries 
began regulating the action of the working class (FLEURY, 1994). In both cases, the 
institutionalization of social policies came about in an environment characterized by 
authoritarianism, in which citizenship was regulated (SANTOS, 1979), and conceded 
only to workers linked to the formal market for urban work, which was quite restricted 
in many cases.
In not conceiving and formulating social policy as a means for changing social re-
lations, the Latin American developmentalist state displayed severe short-sightedness 
in its early days. It neglected to acquire the means and mechanisms that might broaden 
the internal market and homogenize the economic system through homogenizing the 
social element, also contributing to the incorporation of technical progress on a grow-
ing scale through mass consumption. In the structuralists’ original terms, the heart of 
the social lay in addressing the issue of land. Their strategy consisted of redistributing 
the means of production and land access through agrarian reform in order to desta-
bilize the logic and concentrating mechanisms of landed estates, and progressively 
overcome structural heterogeneity and its crippling effect on the elastic labor supply. 
This radical proposal sought to promote a degree of land redistribution so as to absorb 
the labor surplus in agricultural disputes; instead of migrating to cities and lowering 
the value of urban-industrial labor, the agricultural workforce would be “pared down.” 
The various models of agrarian reform introduced in the region over the course of the 
20th century, however, were similarly unable to achieve this (THORP, 1998).
In our understanding, first-generation structuralist thought read the issue of the 
social as essentially a “concentration of factors” (land, in this case), which was compro-
mising investment and change in the technological base.
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However, we might refer to a perspicacious observation from Pinto that would 
pass unnoticed even during the reformulation of post-’90 structural thought. To wit, 
“‘consumption financing’ takes on equal or greater importance (especially in our 
countries) than the ‘investment financing’” (PINTO, 2000 [1970], p.584).
Without continuing in a formulation as to how to incentivize consumption financ-
ing beyond salary increases tied to productivity gains, thus ignoring the central role 
played by social policy in this process, Pinto merely sketches out a solution to the dam-
ming of demand. This inversion of the terms of the model’s equation never gained 
strength among structuralists, only ex-post, during the new phase of economic growth 
of the 2000s. This was the missing link in the structuralist and neo-structuralist models 
for overcoming the obstacles of persistent structural heterogeneity, promoting the ex-
pansion of the market society through social policy, just as expressed in Polanyi (1944).
Not only did structuralist thinking come around slowly to the relevance and cen-
trality of social policy in promoting development, it, in implementing this point with 
a stark delay, privileged the problem of incorporation into the consumer market in a 
blow to the genuine logic of equity. Therefore, it compromised the goal to overcome 
Latin America’s heterogeneity. Aníbal Pinto’s insight would ultimately gain adherence 
on the margins of the structuralist framework, through both redemocratization, forc-
ing governments to consider the vote of the masses, and the prevalence of the model 
of social risk management (HOLZMANN and JORGENSEN, 2000) put forth by neo-
liberalism, remade in the social protection floor (ILO, 2011; FAGNANI, 2015), where 
consumers replace citizens (LAVINAS, 2013).
3. NEO-STRUCTURALISM AND THE RESTORATION OF THE 
SOCIAL, PAUVRETÉ OBLIGE (POST-1990)
In Rodríguez’ (2009) view, structuralist thinking renews itself in the 1990s in incor-
porating the challenge of equity as raised by Fajnzylber (1990). One might recall that 
poverty and indigence indices rose significantly in the region during the critical years 
of the 1980s. While the proportion of the poor rose from 40.5%, in 1980, to 48.4%, in 
1990, the percentage of the indigent went from 18.6% to 22.6%, over the same period. 
In 1990, Latin America could count the stunning sum of 203 million people living in 
poverty, as opposed to 136 million ten years before (CEPAL, 2012). The lost decade 
and the deepening of social issues made it imperative to rethink a development strat-
egy that might include some form of redistribution.
Fajnzylber then argued for a new model of industrialization that would incorpo-
rate technical advancement incrementally and promote equity, filling the so-called 
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“empty box” in allowing Latin America to share growth with greater redistribution, 
just as was the case in the 1970s and ‘80s in countries such as Portugal, Spain, South 
Korea, and Israel, among others. This “new industrialization,” as he dubbed it, ought 
to “bring along with it an improvement in income distribution, [and thus] in standards 
of social equity” (RODRÍGUEZ, 2009, p. 35). This was the only way to incorporate the 
bulk of the population into the “new alliance” for development. To this end, it should 
surmount “the central feature of the process of development in Latin America [which] 
has been its inadequate adoption of technical progress” (FAJNZYLBER, 1990, p.14) 
within the productive system, and from there overcome underdevelopment.
Fajnzylber credits the state with the role of associating the increase in productivity 
to “redistributive patterns that sustain increments of the demand for goods and ser-
vices, these being compatible with the turnover (sale) of similarly expanding produc-
tion” (RODRÍGUEZ, 2009, p.36). Only in opening the black box of technical advance-
ment and innovation would it be possible to change the social structure and promote 
development as a complete process (CEPAL, 1990; 2000, p.10), thus creating inclusion.
The question is: where does social policy fit in this new model, which puts forth 
and bases itself on equity, not competitiveness (FAJNZYLBER, 2000 [1990], p.886)? 
What shape does it take on, since market expansion is always molded by the charac-
teristics of society (POLANYI, 1944)? In the early structuralist phase, consumption 
expanded freely, as it was restricted to the peripheral elites who adopted “consumption 
patterns similar to those in countries where the level of capital accumulation was much 
higher and impregnated with a culture driven by technical progress” (FURTADO, 
2013b, p.179). Hence, the glaring lack of redistributive mechanisms that might back 
up a steady trajectory towards surmounting underdevelopment.
Hence Furtado’s dubbing such a process “modernization” (2013b, p.180): when 
industrialization stops import substitution so as to meet the demands of more sophis-
ticated consumption patterns, it is done without the corresponding process of capital 
accumulation and incorporation of technical progress, which would allow for innova-
tion to be internalized by the productive system. This modernization mirrors a larger 
phenomenon of dependence7, which expresses “the persistent disparity between con-
sumption levels (eventually including part of working-class consumption) and capital 
accumulation in production” (2013b, p.186), as well as productivity gains.
Seeking an alternative to the pressure built up by this modernization, incapable of 
transforming the productive structure or homogenizing keenly unequal Latin Ameri-
7 By dependence, Furtado means the phenomenon in which a country “maintains itself in the position of 
cultural satellite to central countries in the capitalist system, and finds itself in a phase of capital accumu-
lation far inferior to that of the latter” (2013b, p.184).
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can societies, Fajnzylber introduces the themes of equity and social justice, albeit with-
out laying out how to make them into the principle for structuring and coordinating 
the other goals in his famous sequence8. In the 1990 document Transformação Produ-
tiva com Equidade (Productive Transformation with Equity), neither does CEPAL 
explain in detail how such a turn might be produced, rather simply mentioning the 
need to “improve income distribution” (2000 [1990], p.892) and bring industrializa-
tion and technical progress to other sectors, agriculture, and services. Some initiatives 
are launched through the choice of policies that may meet the “imperative of equity” 
and reorient productive dynamics, their core being technical services, training, sup-
port for microbusinesses, redrawing tax policy (to raise savings) and, more generally, 
“fit social services to the needs of the poorest sectors.” In terms of institutional re-
forms, no reference is ever made to social protection systems as an indispensable pillar 
for structural transformations focused on reducing the elevated degree of social and 
productive heterogeneity. The strategy boils down to improving labor input through 
systems for training, accessible education, adult education, and vocational retraining 
(CEPAL, 2000 [1990], p.901).
Bielschowsky (2009, p.177, p.183) recognizes that education and knowledge ap-
pear as a prime vector that might ultimately guide changes in the social structure 
through the expansion of employment and salaries, and thus the wage bill. This is to 
say that, once again, the raising of work productivity takes on central importance in 
the neo-structuralist framework, now shot through by a discourse of equity. The latter, 
as in the seminal phase (1948-1989), is now conceived through the lens of surmount-
ing the structural labor surplus through professional and vocational training.
One can glean from the publications and writings ballasting the strategy for facing 
down the expanding neoliberal wave, amidst societies’ opening up to democracy, that 
social integration should be fomented through the creation of mid-sized and small 
microbusinesses, functioning at minimum standards of efficiency. With the defeat of 
agrarian reform, this new, strongly liberal-hued model has turned to absorbing the la-
bor surplus, an effort now cast in terms of the autonomous worker and micro-business 
owner in the great cities being swelled by the swift process of urbanization. This effort 
would apparently lead to the reduction of underemployment and contribute to the ex-
pansion of the mass domestic market. In parallel, education, when prioritized, would 
improve the qualifications of the labor force, backing up an increase in productivity 
and then in salaries. Bielschowsky (2009, p.175) also sees mobilization around the 
8 According to the author, economic theory that prioritizes competitiveness to promote growth begins 
with the former principle and seeks to have equity as its output. In his proposal, the following equation is 
inverted: equity => austerity (understood as a change in consumption patterns) => growth => competi-
tiveness.
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return to a democratic order as a path to reconfigure, this time in a virtuous dynamic, 
the relationship between the structure of supply and demand. This was previously 
decentralized (hampering the market society and the wage bill, with consequences not 
only in terms of concentration of wealth and keen inequality, but also in the reproduc-
tion of underdevelopment).
Social policy as a strong institutional element of an integrated, reflexive, and di-
verse system of social protection, in the forms that backed up economic growth in 
the European welfare states and even in the United States9, is not proposed in the 
neo-structuralist framework. According to Rodríguez, once again, “Latin American 
structuralism tends to consider the state and the sociopolitical relationships that sus-
tain it as key in the search for and choosing of alternatives” (2009, p.48), thus ruling 
out a possible, functional mediation of social policy in redesigning social relationships 
and fomenting development.
The neo-structuralist perspective (BIELSCHOWSKY, 2009) finally comes to frui-
tion in the 2000s with the return to and renewed interest in state intervention in the 
economy, no longer exclusively tied to the expansion and diversification of the indus-
trial sector alone, but also with a more homogenous and broader view of development.
The main novelty of the economic growth wave post-2003-4 seems to be the fact 
that mass consumption has finally set in, notably through a rise in employment and 
salaries and a considerable broadening of credit availability (a new factor in the Latin 
American context), making the mass domestic market one of the drivers of the return 
to development. One may thus affirm that the innovation of the 2000s was that “mod-
ernization” came to the working classes as well, through the extension of a consump-
tion pattern previously restricted to the lifestyles of the middle classes, such as cars, 
appliances, electronics, and a number of other goods. Fajnzylber’s critical reading of 
the Latin American development model of the 1980s, cited in the epigraph to this ar-
ticle, remains uncomfortably relevant and fits like a glove when introducing the topic 
of the next section, which addresses the social regulation model in vogue in the region. 
In his words, in Latin America, “physical objects have been transplanted to a greater 
extent than the know-how and the institutions required to design, produce, and adapt 
these objects to local conditions” (1990, p.20), promoting the “convergence of ‘show-
case modernness’” (1990, p.26).
9 The creation of Social Security in 1935, with public social security and unemployment insurance, in 
addition to other forms of income guarantees through targeted policies. For more on this, see Krugman 
(2007). 
15
Lavinas, L.; simões, a. social policy and structural heterogeneity in latin america: the turning point of the 21st century
Rev. Econ. Contemp., núm. esp., 2017: elocation - e172128, p. 1-35 DOI: 10.1590/198055272128
4. LATIN AMERICA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: GROWTH AND 
INCORPORATION INTO THE MARKET
The 2000s saw an important watershed across Latin America, especially after 2003, 
when the region entered a promising phase of strong economic recovery, with an av-
erage GDP growth rate around 4.1%, from 2004-2013, as opposed to an average of 
2.7%, from 1984-2003 (IMF, 2014). In addition to riding the wave of rising commodity 
prices worldwide, given its abundance of natural resources, Latin America also moved 
to consolidate its macroeconomic and institutional fundamentals (BELLEFONTAINE 
and RHARRAB, 2014), further favoring a successful recovery out of the crisis.
Another characteristic of this clear bounce-back is the increasingly intense ad-
vance of the service sector, which came to 64% of regional GDP, in 2013. Regional 
industry remains lacking, hit hard by international competition and reduced competi-
tiveness, given the resilience of low productivity levels in the manufacturing sector, 
which was even more severely struck by the effects of exchange rate appreciation.
The most influential factor in growth is family consumption – which comes to 2/3 
of Latin America’s GDP – reflecting the increase in employment, salaries, and credit. 
According to Bellefontaine and Rharrab,
between 2004 and 2013, 85% of regional growth has come from the accumulation of 
production factors, labor in particular. The great contribution from labor input, 
which has been constant over the past 20 years, may be explained by the rise of the 
working-age population, an increase in their participation in the job market, the 
drop in unemployment, and an improvement in human capital. (2013, p. 23)
Indeed, between 2003 and 2013, the urban unemployment rate fell from 11.1% to 
6.7% in Latin America (CEPAL/ILO, 2014, p.28), a noteworthy performance, although 
this downward trend has favored women less, with a rate of 7.3% as opposed to 5.8% 
for men. Employment rates went up, as did the gross employment rate10. In parallel, 
informality saw a slight dip and went from an approximate rate of 50% in 2003 to 
46.4% in 2013 (CEPALSTAT)11, leading to a broadening of formalized wage labor and 
the presence of entrepreneurs in the employed population (CEPAL, 2014, p.140). Even 
so, informality remains a registered trademark of the region.
10 The gross employment rate rose 5.7% from 2003-2010, off a negative figure (-0.6%) from the previous 
period (1991-1998) (CEPAL, 2012, p.206). 
11 According to the OIT (2013), informality rates (for non-agricultural work) oscillated across Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean, from 40% in Uruguay to 75% in the Plurinational State of Bolivia.
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In terms of productivity, today’s bottlenecks were already seen as problems in the 
1950s. Apparent labor productivity (GDP/employed population) grew 1.6% a.a., from 
2002-2012, reverting the poor showing of the period 1990-2002 (0.1%). However, the 
agricultural sector12 – characterized by low productivity – would see the greatest pro-
ductivity gains of the turn of the century: an increase of 47% from 2002-2011, against 
just 9% for the manufacturing sector over the same period (CEPAL, 2014, p.147-148). 
Product per employee in the high-productivity sector13 was, in 2011, 5.8 times that of 
its low-productivity counterpart. In 2002, the ratio was just a bit higher, at 6.4 times. 
This means that the challenge of social and productive heterogeneity persists, and 
continues to undermine the creation of a more integrated and converging dynamic 
with the dissemination of a more equitable pattern of growth. The low-productivity 
sector, which includes agriculture, commerce, and services, still accounted for 65% of 
employment in the region in 2011, as opposed to 69%, in 2002. Likewise, its size as a 
percentage of regional GDP remained practically unaltered during the period, around 
40% (CEPAL, 2014).
In a recent study that examined seven Latin American countries14, Bielschowsky 
et al. (2013) confirm this trend, estimating that from 1950 to 1980, total  productivity 
grew, on average, 2.4% a.a., led by industry, with an annual growth rate of 3.2%. In 
contrast, the recent period of 1980-2005 saw total productivity rise just 0.1% a.a. in 
the region, this time with agriculture at the fore (2.4% a.a.). Labor productivity in 
industry, across this sampling of countries, showed mediocre growth (0.8% a.a.). The 
service sector, meanwhile, saw a negative figure (-0.8%). By way of comparison, in 
Asia (six countries)15, average labor productivity across all sectors rose 2.9% a.a. over 
the same period, with sectorial performance of 3.7% a.a. in industry, 2.6% a.a. in agri-
culture, and 1.5% in services.
The absence of a solution for challenges around labor productivity in Latin Amer-
ica is thus patently apparent, with persistent profound structural heterogeneity, given 
the hypertrophy of the low-productivity tertiary sector (BIELSCHOWSKY, 2013). The 
rebound of economic activity, with a rise in employment, remuneration, and the ad-
vance of formalization, did not manage to derail this endogenous, structural mecha-
nism for reproducing the region’s inequalities.
12 A similar diagnosis to that of Lora and Pagés (2011), in which, compared to the rest of the world, labor 
productivity in Latin America only performed favorably in agriculture, with practically zero growth in 
the service sector and improvements below the international average in industry. 
13 According to CEPAL (2014), this category includes financial services, electricity, mining, real estate, and 
business services. 
14 To wit, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru.
15 Here, China, India, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. 
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As it has been amply stated, the minimum wage, with a strong and long-standing 
institutional framework in the region16, becomes a key instrument within the equation 
for stimulating consumption and a prime instrument for social policy in the hands of 
the state. According to the ILO (2014), on average, the regional minimum wage rose 
by 57.5% 9 (in real terms) between 2000 and 201317. The rise in the national minimum 
remuneration, which spreads gains to workers beyond the growth of labor productiv-
ity, stands as the principal mechanism for primary distribution, via the labor market.
A number of authors (LAVINAS, 2013a; INCHAUSTE ET AL, 2012), as well as 
CEPAL (2012) dovetail in recognizing that the pivotal factor in reducing poverty in 
Latin America over the past decade was the growth in employment. In CEPAL’s view, 
new opportunities in the labor market can explain ¾ of the drop in poverty in the re-
gion over the 2000s, with the relevant rate dropping from 27.9% in 2013 (164 million 
people below the poverty line)18, as against 43.9% in 2002 (ECLAC, 2013). Interpreta-
tions also converge on the point that wage inequality is notably correlated to real gains 
in the minimum wage19.
Meanwhile, conditional cash transfer programs continue to spread, pushing to-
wards incorporation into the market. In little-integrated areas, where a subsistence-
oriented mode of social reproduction still persists – for example, in the regions and 
countries where indigenous communities or small-scale farmers dominate – and for 
a contingent of tens of millions of the poor and excluded on urban peripheries, with 
an income deficit that generates negative externalities and restricts solid market func-
tioning, these programs provide, more than basic support, a definitive link with the 
commodification of a number of areas of life. Nearly all Latin American countries have 
now adopted conditional cash transfer programs, which are low-cost and have weak 
institutional backing20, but considerable visibility (LAVINAS, 2013).
Although social spending has risen from 2002 to 2013, going from 15.2% to 19.2% 
of the region’s GDP (CEPAL, 2014), the area most privileged in this respect has been 
monetary transfers (around 2/3 of social spending), to the detriment of spending on 
16 On this, see CEPAL (2014), with a detailed analysis of the policy for real increases in the minimum wage 
in Latin America starting in the early 2000s (p.152-160), and its impact on reducing inequalities.
17 See ILO (2014, p.39). 
18 One might note that the poverty line adopted in Latin American countries generally follows the World 
Bank’s guidelines: US$ 2.25/day, with the indigence line at US$ 1.25/day. 
19 CEPAL (2014) recognizes “that minimum wages have an impact across the distribution (lighthouse ef-
fect) and that real increases have had an equalizing effect on distribution” (p.152), demonstrating how 
the ratio of minimum wage/average and mean salary saw increases in the majority of Latin American 
countries from 2003-2012, sometimes spectacularly so, as was the case with Argentina and Uruguay. 
20 In no Latin American country do these conditional cash transfer programs stand as a right. They may be 
eliminated or modified by a decision from the central or federal executive branch at any time. 
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healthcare, education, housing, and sanitation, which have grown more slowly. Over 
more than two decades (1991-2013), while contributory and noncontributory cash 
transfers rose from 6.3% to 9.1% of the regional GDP, healthcare spending rose only 
from 3.2% to 4.2%; education from 3.7% to 5%; where as housing registered a very 
slight increase, from 0.6% to 0.8% of the region’s GDP. In 2013, deficits in healthcare 
coverage were high (affecting 1/3 of formal workers and 57% of informal workers, 
according to the 2014 Social Panorama), just as a considerable percentage of workers 
did not contribute to social insurance (44.6% of salaried workers and 87.6% of autono-
mous workers).
This spending profile has thus prioritized correcting market failures instead of 
incentivizing social homogenization, through policies to equalize access to decom-
modified services, which would certainly bear a much higher cost and demand serious 
and consequential tax reform, engaged with creating a more far-reaching standard of 
redistribution.
It thus seems relevant to affirm that, in the 21st century, the role played by social 
policies in Latin America harbors significant differences from the virtuous role dis-
played in European countries during the postwar period. The first difference has to 
do with the timid growth of investment in social infrastructure.The demand for which 
tends to rise as demographic factors – such as an aging population, a new profile of 
family arrangements, the lengthening of the educational process for growing contin-
gents of the population – as well as factors intrinsic to the process of capitalist mod-
ernization and the broadening of the consumer market have pressed for an increase 
in the provision of public services. Here, the public sector clearly cedes ground to the 
privatization of a growing array of services, healthcare being the most paradigmatic 
case, although hardly the only one21.
If income rises and the public provision of services continues to register deficits 
in provision, both in terms of quality and quantity, the advance of private provision 
is naturally incentivized with the support of new financial services such as insurance, 
credit, and private pension funds. The latter have seen strong segmentation, increas-
ingly meeting the needs of all income brackets, although still unable to guarantee ideal 
coverage or security against risks and uncertainties. The Brazilian case, as discussed in 
the next section, will illustrate this dynamic.
21 Due to a lack of space, we will simply cite a few examples that show that families’ private spending (out 
of pocket and private insurance) holds the greatest weight in the region. In the case of Colombia and El 
Salvador, such spending represents 45-49% of total spending on healthcare. In Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and 
Uruguay, meanwhile, the private portion of healthcare spending varies between 54% and 63% (data for 
2009 to 2011), tending to trend upward (SANCHEZ, 2014). Universal public healthcare has not been a 
part of the redistribution of welfare on the continent. 
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Another difference in the profile and structure of the prevailing model of social 
regulation vis-à-vis the more redistributive model implemented in European coun-
tries lies in the absence of linkages in the formation of a virtuous circle between pro-
duction and mass consumption, with the weakest tie being not only low productivity 
levels, but also low investment rates, which, despite a rising trend over the decade, 
have consistently fallen short of the levels necessary to drive more active, sustained 
growth. The investment rate stands at 23% of the regional GDP (BELLEFONTAINE 
and RHARRAB, 2014). If we consider the investment rates of the countries with the 
largest economies, such as Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Mexico, only Chile 
saw investments at 24.3% of GDP22, in 2013.
Finally, one might recall the strong expansion of credit in the region, which, on 
average, rose from 31% of GDP in 2004 to 38.5% in 2011 (annual growth rate of 9%)23. 
As Hansen and Sulla (2013) indicate, credit to families accelerated much faster than 
corporate credit, with emphasis on consumer credit, followed by housing loans. Con-
sequently, the role of credit in driving innovation, disseminating it throughout the 
productive structure and promoting the concentration of capital indispensable for 
economic development, seems to have been left aside as the leading tendency in the 
expansion of credit and financial markets on the Latin American continent.
We argue that the Brazilian case is extremely illustrative of this stimulating con-
sumption strategy through expanded access to the credit market and the appropriation 
of social policy to guarantee the growth of domestic demand from a perspective of 
monetization and commodification instead of strengthening and consolidating social 
protection systems. Despite a few important counter-reforms, such as i) the re-nation-
alization of Argentine pensions in 2008; ii) the creation of a basic solidary pension, 
public retirement funds for poor seniors who did not contribute to social security, as 
was the case in Chile (2008); and iii) Renta Dignidad, in Bolivia, a public universal 
pension scheme, or the resilience of Social Security in Brazil amidst pushes to disman-
tle its financial architecture (LAVINAS, 2014; FAGNANI and VAZ, 2013), it is clear 
that social protection systems remain either unfinished or at risk. This is said taking 
into consideration that they lack an equally essential dimension of social policy, being 
the provision of universal public services to the whole of the population, swimming 
against the tide of commodification and the conditionalities that regulate and restrict 
access to assistance programs.
22 For a parallel, recall that the Asian countries had investment rates lower to Latin American ones in the 
1960s, and saw them rise steadily starting in the 1970s. 
23 This dynamic varied significantly from country to country. Brazil, Paraguay, and Venezuela stand out 
over this period as the countries with the swiftest expansion of credit.
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A “fractured” paradigm is thus implemented; instead of promoting the decom-
modification of the workforce, it incentivizes commodification all the way down, 
Fraser (2012), subordinating social policy to economic policy, the former understood 
simply as a multiplier to foment growth and the expansion of the domestic market in 
the short term.
5. BRAZIL AS ILLUSTRATION OF THE MODEL OF COMMODIFICATION OF SOCIAL POLICY
The ideas from this new cycle of growth have not moved away from the liberal field, 
although they have shifted somewhat in relation to the policies in place over the course 
of the 1990s (especially in the need for exchange rate devaluation and a raise in sala-
ries). The heart of the proposals revolved around the urgency of expanding markets, 
with the state tasked with guaranteeing macroeconomic stability by controlling rela-
tive prices. In this model, redistributive issues would be secondary, without taking on 
crucial importance in pushing growth, although Brazil – in this sense a mirror of Latin 
America – saw a reduction in its levels of inequality and poverty post-2000, swimming 
against the tide of the trend in developed countries.
Since then, successive administrations24 have put greater emphasis on a tripod of 
policies for stimulating domestic demand – increases in social spending, especially 
cash transfers; a policy of raising the real minimum wage; and expansion of personal 
credit, all this set against a panorama of growth with increased employment. This 
model, which Carneiro (2012) and Bastos (2012) have called social developmental-
ism, seeks to solve a series of structural bottlenecks via the expansion of the domestic 
consumer market, chief among its aims a greater diversification of the productive sec-
tor, which would drive a rise in productivity levels so as to overcome severe social and 
productive heterogeneity.
In broad strokes, social developmentalism may be defined as a model that includes 
something close to one of the main ideas of original structuralism, to wit, an emphasis 
on the growth of the mass consumer market. However, unlike the first wave, it includes 
the social dimension as a central pillar in Brazilian developmental strategy rather than 
simply focusing on demand.
In other words, the development of productive forces, seen by structuralism as the 
principal means for national development, is driven in new developmentalism by a 
series of policies focused on incorporating the population into the consumer market.
24 Here we are referring essentially to the second Lula administration, post-2006, and the Dilma administra-
tion (begun in 2011). 
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Though it does not provide a defined theoretical framework, comprising rather 
an array of practical initiatives rooted in a political base with powerful social appeal 
(CARNEIRO, 2012), new developmentalism does not set out to break with the pri-
macy of the market. In fact, the group of policies that characterize it seek to expand 
mercantile relations through the broadening of consumption of goods and services of 
all kinds across all levels of society.
It has been estimated that between 2003 and 2012, 18.7 million formal jobs25 were 
created in Brazil, while average labor income26 saw a real increase on the order of 
30% over the same period (LAVINAS, 2014). The unemployment rate, meanwhile, fell 
from 12.4% in 2003 to 5.4% in 2013 (IBGE, PME). Not even this could cut the rate of 
informality at the pace expected, stalling at a still-elevated level of 42%.
In analyzing the policy tripod mentioned above, it becomes evident that social 
spending increases as a portion of GDP, reaching around 21% in 2013. As in Latin 
America as a whole, the bulk of this spending comes in the form of direct cash trans-
fers (15% of GDP or 2/3 of social spending) (LAVINAS, 2013a) for the same year. If 
one considers federal social spending alone (which corresponded to 15.9% of GDP 
in 201327) for the period 2000-2013, a similar trend emerges: direct cash transfers28 
 represented around 70% in 2013, almost identical to the 2002 figure (68.8%).
As for the minimum wage, its real value practically doubled between 2001 and 
201329. It was responsible for 75% of the reduction in wage inequalities over the decade 
(VALOR ECONÔMICO, 2014). Since the minimum wage is a peg for the social secu-
rity floor30, it also allowed pension and retirement funds to have a significant impact 
on the drop in the Gini index, which fell from 0.593 in 2001 to 0.527 in 2013, whenit 
stabilized.
More jobs and rising labor income led to the broadening of work remuneration 
as a portion of GDP, when measured through the lens of income, revealing increased 
labor input in the composition of national product. From 2003 to 2013– the last year of 
the series made available by IBGE’s System of National Accounts – the wage bill went 
from 38.5% to 43.4% of GDP.
25 RAIS – CAGED, Ministério do Trabalho.
26 Estimated in 2013 at R$2,000.00 per month (constant values), while they had stood at R$1,494.00 (con-
stant values), US$909 and US$680, respectively. 
27 Tesouro Nacional (2016). Gasto Social do Governo Central. 2002-2015. <http://www.tesouro.fazenda.
gov.br/documents/10180/318974/Gasto+Social+Governo+Central/c4c3d5b6-8791-46fb-b5e9-57a016d-
b24ec>. This figure includes direct social spending and tax credits. 
28 Contributory pension benefits, and also welfare benefits.
29 In January 2014, the minimum wage stood at R$724.00 or US$330 per month.
30 2/3 of retirement and pension funds in Brazil, for a total of 21 million in monthly benefits, are set at the 
minimum wage. 
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Finally, one might look to the behavior of credit, which broadened stunningly over 
the decade, soaring from 22% of GDP in 2001 to 56.5% in December 2013 (BACEN, 
2014). By the end of 2013, free credit came to 56.6% of the total volume of credit. This 
led to an explosion in sales, which more than doubled in volume from 2003 to 2014 
(IBGE, Pesquisa Mensal de Comércio). Input from family income consequently rose 
over the course of the decade, going from 18.3% to 45.5% from 2005 to 2014 (Figure 
1), growing faster than average income.











































































































































































Note: in relation to income accumulated over the past twelve months.
Source: Banco Central do Brasil.
Such spectacular progress should be seen in a context of creating new forms of 
credit31 meant to resolve inefficiencies around access to financial markets, especially 
related to high interest rates – which, albeit sinking over the past decade, and although 
inflation has remained under the limit of the current target (6.5%), still rank among 
the highest in the world. This evidently penalizes family income seriously, but does not 
hamper consumption, which is pushed on principally by the extension of repayment 
terms. Figure 2 shows the evolution of interest rates on individual loans, demonstrat-
ing that the credit supply is strongly segmented. For those with some kind of collateral, 
such as pension funds or a permanent position (civil servant or formally employed 
31 Two types of lines of credit have grown significantly since late 2003. One is consigned loans for formal 
workers and civil servants, instituted in December 2003 under the first Lula administration. In September 
2004, they would be extended to retirees and pensioners under the general social welfare policy. In the 
so-called Personal Loan With Payroll Discount, the value of repayment installments is compulsorily and 
directly taken from salaries or benefits, and interest rates charged by banks or financial or credit institu-
tions are lower than market levels, as these borrowers offer collateral. The maximum period for paying off 
this kind of loan is 72 months. Such loans to individuals fall under the category of free credit. The other 
kind of loan that saw considerable growth, but under the category of directed credit, was microcredit, 
which includes personal credit and has taken in growing numbers of the poorest and most vulnerable 
groups, contributing to finance consumption (SOARES, 2014). 
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stable worker), consigned credit32 guarantees lower rates, around 30% a.a. For the rest, 
being workers and people in more vulnerable and unstable situations, without col-
lateral, rates on personal credit – especially for financing consumption – can be triple 
that, with rising figures that vary from 75% to 95% a.a.


































































































Source: Banco Central do Brasil.
In terms of hopes for changes in the productive structure and for a rise in labor 
productivity, the situation is quite different. Indeed, the Brazil of the 2000s still dis-
plays relatively low productivity levels. Figure3 shows the three sectorsin whichpro-
ductivity33 rose significantly, in the period 2000-2013. First, come extractive industries 
(mainly due to investments made by Petrobras), followed by commerce, and then agri-
culture and animal husbandry, with agriculture and extractive industries undoubtedly 
spurred by the commodities boom over the course of the decade. The sector most fa-
vored by job creation, meanwhile, service, saw a sharp fall in productivity (-8.6%), but 
lower than theone registered by the manufacturing sector, that reached -19.6% over 
the period. Even construction, a sector that has recovered from 2008 onwards, has not 
benefitted from improvements in its productivity levels.
32 According to BACEN, as of December 2013, consigned credit represented 28.9% of personal credit. 
33 Productivity was calculated using the ratio between added value and employed personnel in each sector 
of economic activity. 
24Rev. Econ. Contemp., núm. esp., 2017: elocation - e172128, p. 1-35 DOI: 10.1590/198055272128
LavInas, L.; sImões, a. social policy and structural heterogeneity in latin america: the turning point of the 21st century
Figure 3 – Productivity rate* by sectors of economic activity, 

























































Note: (*) 2013 figures were inflated to 2000 prices, using the GDP deflator.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from IBGE – National Accounts System.
These data suggest that, despite a record number of formal jobs being created, 
Brazil did not attain greater homogeneity in its productive structure.
But what might have favored a strong rise in productivity in the agriculture and 
animal husbandry sector, for example? Our hypothesis is that, beyond a consider-
able rise in commodity valuations, a given framework for social and economic policy 
contributed to paring down the workforce surplus. On one hand, poverty-fighting 
policies, via cash transfer programs, wound up taking their beneficiaries out of the 
job market or reducing the pressure that they exerted, thus diminishing severely low-
productivity underemployment34. In the absence of agrarian reform, which lost steam 
over the course of Lula’s two terms and Dilma’s administration, it fell to social poverty-
fighting policy to guarantee monetary minimums through the Bolsa Família Program 
and rural welfare, ensuring incorporation into the consumer market. On the other 
hand, the national minimum wage aided in homogenizing the lower limit of labor 
remuneration (through the increase in the minimum wage), while political decisions 
from the federal executive branch elevated the poorest sectors’ propensity to consume, 
thus raising demand. With the reduction in the labor surplus, which had been holding 
back an increase in the base salary, not only could the lower limit be raised, but the 
average salary could rise as well.
34 From 2000 to 2009, agricultural employment as a portion of the Brazilian occupational structure fell from 
22.3% to 17.3% (IBGE, 2014). In absolute terms, there was a reduction of 4.7% in the population em-
ployed in this sector, while added value grew 34% over the same period – hence the significant increase 
in productivity, as shown in Figure 3.
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It is plausible to suppose that social protection, a minor player, and one nearly 
absent in the previous phases of economic growth, has been successful as a strategy to 
foment demand and the expansion of the mass market at the turn of the 21st century. 
This compensated, to some measure, for the absence in productivity gains that ought 
to have been observed throughout the productive structure in the wake of growth. The 
goal of market incorporation implies a guarantee of income, this being a prominent 
framework in social policy in Brazil as well as Latin America as a whole, during this 
phase of economic recovery marked by the predominance of governments recognized 
as center-left.
With this, the country’s notorious dynamic insufficiency – to wit, the persistence 
of structural underemployment, which hinders development – is partially addressed. 
This was done not by increments in productivity spread throughout the economy, 
with substantive transformations in the productive structure and employment (both 
lacking, for example, in the key industrial sector), but via institutional changes in the 
reproduction of the most vulnerable, least-qualified groups, now either placed outside 
the job market or concentrated in the service sector.
Our hypothesis is that Brazil’s recent return to growth was made possible by a 
certain sort of social regulation, which prioritizes programs and policies that feature 
income guarantees, alongside the real increase in the minimum wage and the elimi-
nation of barriers to the financial market. Other aspects, not less relevant, also came 
into play, such as tax exemption policy, which was called in to compensate for stand-
ing structural problems with a not-entirely-successful attempt at remedying Brazil’s 
low competitiveness domestically and abroad (CORDILHA, 2014). Social policy thus 
becomes the mechanism par excellence in the search for a short-term solution for part 
of the structural underemployment of the low-productivity workforce, reducing its 
supply on the job market but guaranteeing it as a presence on the consumer market. 
It does not, however, address the issue of structural heterogeneity, which continues to 
generate profound inequalities.
Bielschowsky indicates that one of the potential drivers for Brazilian development 
in the long term of the so-called social-developmentalist phase (post-2006) might be 
production and mass consumption35, as they allow for “a virtuous integration between 
growth and an improvement in income distribution” (2012, p.739). But, while chains 
were undeniably struck away on the consumption side, production displays a less than 
virtuous dynamic. Figure 4, taken from Cordilha (2014), demonstrates not only a fall 
in the manufacturing industry’s input in terms of total value added to the economy 
from 1996 to 2011, but also reveals, on the external front,
35 The other two factors would be the use of natural resources and investments in infrastructure. 
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signs of Brazil’s strengthening as an exporter of raw materials, given growing depen-
dence on the exportation of non-industrial and low-tech goods to sustain Brazilian 
surpluses, alongside a loss of competitiveness in industrial goods, with greater defi-
cits around products of higher technological intensity. (2014, p.3)
The growing importation of manufactured goods may be seen in Brazil’s 11-place 
leap in just seven years on the international ranking of the largest importers, from 31st 
place, in 2005, to 20th, in 2012 (IEDI). One should also recall another factor pushing 
the expansion of mass consumption domestically, which contributed to putting pres-
sure on imports – the prolonged overvaluation of the Real (SINGER, 2012), to the 
detriment of the manufacturing sector, compensated by ample tax exemptions that 
wound up hobbling Social Security’s budget36 and any chance of broadening the scope 
of universal policies such as healthcare.
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Note: (*) According to the OECD classification used by SECEX/MDIC.
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on data by SECEX/MDIC from Cordilha (2014).
Without a doubt, the past decade has brought decisive government regulatory ac-
tion (FURTADO, 1987, p. 207), through social policy. However, the fractures in the 
model of social regulation, dominated by a specific kind of policy, have made it pos-
sible to drive the mass consumer market without adequately addressing the persistent 
bottleneck of structural heterogeneity. This would mean tackling grave problems and 
36 A number of authors (Fagnani and Vaz, Fagnani, Cordilha) have called attention to the fact that tax 
exemptions, particularly via the suspension of employers’ contributions to social security, puts the Social 
Security budget at risk; once in surplus, it may begin incurring deficits. After the 2008-9 crisis, the Bra-
zilian government moved to expand these payroll exemptions, favoring around 50 fairly uncompetitive 
sectors. Once a temporary measure, it is set to become permanent starting in 2015. According to Treasury 
estimates, quoted by Cordilha (2014), such exemptions may come to R$ 21.6 billion or US$ 10 billion in 
2014, a figure slightly higher than total annual spending on the poverty-fighting Bolsa Família Program. 
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long-standing gaps in policy, including agrarian reform (to reduce the concentration 
of property), the universalization of access to quality healthcare and education, and 
equalizing well-being, to say nothing of tax reform (to reduce the concentration of 
income and wealth). If, as Furtado has put it (1987, p.210), the importance placed on 
non-economic factors in the interpretation of underdevelopment justifies the label 
“structuralist,” then one may conclude that structuralist thought has finally incorpo-
rated social policy into its framework, being a non-economic dimension of the repro-
duction of life. It is social policy that alters the social structure. But, in recent cases, it 
has done so oriented almost exclusively towards the incorporating previously excluded 
groups into the consumer market, not prioritizing social inclusion. Herein lies its lib-
eral slant.
The issue at center stage in the structuralist paradigm, the elevation of productiv-
ity, is thus tabled.
While in the first generation of structuralist thought the key missing link lay in ig-
norance of the role of social policy in promoting growth in the middle and long term, 
this phase of development seems to be lacking in its ignorance of the systemic role of 
social policy in adequately and effectively addressing the challenge of productivity and 
equity in the long term, through the promotion of universal and unconditional pro-
grams that seek to strengthen mechanisms for increasing social homogeneity, reduc-
ing differentials in education, healthcare, well-being, and hence productivity as well. 
For Furtado, underdevelopment means a disparity between the consumption levels of 
significant groups of a country’s population (1972). It seems evident that such differ-
entials in consumption patterns are increasingly shifting away from durable consumer 
goods (cars, electronics, or large home appliances), and towards access to often indis-
pensable goods such as water and basic sanitation, and others, such as education and 
healthcare, that may truly open up opportunities and equalize living conditions and 
well-being.
In the decade of the return to growth, while consumption boomed, the percentage 
of households with adequate infrastructure – sanitation, trash collection, and treated 
water – went from 53.6%, in 2001, to 63.4%, in 2013. This means that more than a 
third of Brazilian homes still fall short of a decent standard of living. In the case of the 
lowest-income households – up to half a minimum wage per month – 48% still lacked 
adequate sanitation (IBGE, 2014). The progression of certain other goods, meanwhile, 
with individualized access mediated by the market, has seen a sharp upward bend. 
This is the case with cell phones, for example, which are now present in practically 
90% of Brazilian households, as opposed to 31% in 2003. The percentages of homes 
with computers (12.5% in 2001 and 48.9% in 2013) and washing machines (33.6% in 
2001 and 57.5% in 2013) also rose notably.
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In a study by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE, 2012), 
based on a methodology developed by Mexico’s Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de 
la Política de Desarrollo Social – CONEVAL, the population was divided into vulner-
able groups. Adesignation determined not only by income, but other indicators as well 
that point to the existence of deficits in the population’s access to a range of services 
that are indispensable in social reproduction. First and foremost, the proportion of 
vulnerable citizens as classified by income37 and social service deficits38 still takes in 
22.4% of Brazilian, although 34.2% are not affected by either kind of vulnerability. The 
most interesting factor, however, is that the proportion of the population falling under 
simply income poverty is 7.4%, while 36% are made vulnerable by some kind of social 
service deficit. This reveals two things: the first is that the incidence of vulnerability 
through social service deficits is greater than vulnerability through income poverty 
alone, and the second is that most people under the latter category also display some 
social service deficit.
As public health suffers from chronic underfinancing in Brazil (BAHIA, 2013), 
despite having the resources of the Social Security budget to better meet demand, 
private provision advances – while remaining inaccessible to the vast majority of the 
population. In Brazil, a country with a public, universal, free healthcare system, a vic-
tory from the era of redemocratization enshrined in the 1988 Constitution, private 
spending on healthcare outstrips public. While the former comes to 5.5% of GDP, the 
second stands at 4%. Moreover, ¼ of the population has private healthcare plans and 
that figure has only grown along with family incomes39, stimulated by tax exemptions.
Likewise, 35% of Brazilian workers did not finish primary school, which becomes 
an important factor in stubbornly low work productivity. This deficit is mirrored at 
other educational levels; just 54.4% of 15- to 17-year-olds were enrolled in high school. 
This explains why, in 2013, only 54.3% of 19-year-olds had graduated high school 
(INEP). As for higher education, and in spite of university quota programs meant to 
include ethnic and racial minorities, 80% of college students attend private colleges, 
37 To calculate income poverty, the study employed a relative measure: the proportion of people earning 
income below 60% of the median. 
38 Social service deficits were defined by a series of indicators, summarized under the following headings: a) 
educational lag; b) physical characteristics of the household; c) access to basic services; d) access to social 
security. 
39 According to data from the 2008-2009 Family Budget Survey (POF), the richest families (the highest 
10% by income), devoted 42.3% of their monthly spending on healthcare in paying for private plans, 
on average, while the poorest families (40% of the tail end of the distribution) spent an average of 7%. 
This tendency is flipped in the case of expenses on medicine, which take up nothing less than 74.2% of 
monthly health-related spending for the poorest families and 33.6% in the health budgets of the richest 
families (IBGE, 2012).
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access to which is generally made possible by student loans obtained via the financial 
market.
Many performance indicators could be called up on the subject of educational 
quality, such as the country’s clearly unsatisfactory PISA results. Just one figure is 
enough to shock on this account, however, related to adequate school infrastructure 
as defined in the PNE (National Education Plan), being access to: treated water and 
basic sanitation, electricity, high-speed internet, handicapped accessibility, libraries, 
spaces for sports practice, access to cultural goods and art, and science-related equip-
ment and laboratories. While in 2009, 3.06% of Brazilian schools met those criteria, 
by 2013 the figure was virtually identical: 4.2% (MEC/INEP/Deed). That is to say, 
over nearly a decade of growth, crucial investments in social infrastructure did not 
keep up.
Castro (2013) has estimated the distributive effect of public goods such as health-
care and education, as well as cash transfers. He observes that in the current situation, 
“increased spending on public healthcare and education generate extremely positive 
developments, in terms of both growth and income distribution” (2013, p.130). Tar-
geted transfers, meanwhile (Bolsa Família and BPC) had a smaller impact on growth 
and slightly more on the drop in inequality. This is a clear indicator that while the 
current pattern of social spending, mostly focused on cash transfers, may stimulate 
the domestic market, it contributes less to feeding a virtuous dynamic of long-term 
economic growth and facilitating the rise of locally produced value added.
We argue that the financing model for mass consumption, adopted in Brazil with 
relative success under the second Lula administration and under Dilma and meant to 
stimulate the domestic market and keep the economy functioning closer to its poten-
tial by driving job creation, broadened the integration of low-income sectors – and 
even the poorest – into the market. This integration was also facilitated by consumer 
credit in its various forms (Minha Casa Melhor40 and Crédito Caixa Fácil are just two 
of such programs). The extension of the credit market to the destitute and to low-
income families, with terms strictly regulated by the federal government, is doubtless 
a  novelty and fills an important role in the democratization of consumption. However, 
this model of social regulation does not promote a process of social homogenization 
that might overcome profound, inequality-reproducing cleavages. It does remove bar-
riers to integration into the market, but does not facilitate convergence to a standard 
40 In June 2013, the federal government launched an exclusive financing line on furniture and household 
appliances for beneficiaries of the house-purchasing program Minha Casa, Minha Vida. The expecta-
tion is that 3.7 million families will be benefited, for a total of R$18.7 billion. The credit line offers up to 
R$ 5,000 per beneficiary. The interest rate is 5% per year, with a repayment term of 48 months. Families 
will be provided a magnetic Minha Casa Melhor card and given up to 12 months to spend their credit.
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of well-being increasingly shared by all. The model of market incorporation cannot 
support a solid and sustainable standard for social inclusion, a middle or long-term 
path to the solution for the bottlenecks imposed by the permanence of profound social 
and productive heterogeneity.
6. BY WAY OF CONCLUSION
It is no coincidence that the first strategy for broadening and strengthening capital 
markets in Latin America consisted of the privatization of public funds, sustaining the 
regional transition, in the 1990s, from pay-as-you-go systems to capitalization systems 
(MESA-LAGO, 2009; LAVINAS, 2013). This attempt failed in part, and public pay-as-
you-go systems had to be reintroduced.
The other strategy for expanding financialization came through the expansion of 
mass consumption through consumer credit for the most vulnerable, previously ex-
cluded groups. Conditional cash transfer programs came to be tied to this logic of 
market extension, stimulating links between the poorest groups and the financial sec-
tor through credit, insurance, and microcredit (LAVINAS, 2013; SOARES, 2014). In 
the absence of collateral, a steady (albeit small) income backed by the government 
opens up opportunities to grow mass consumption through credit, the newest forms of 
which seek to include groups only recently incorporated into the market. Magnitude 
guarantees scale. The deficit in the provision of free public services in terms of both 
quality and quantity, segmenting the market and exacerbating government shortfalls, 
has driven citizens to credit and insurance markets in search of security. This dynamic 
produces some negative externalities, such as the increase in family debt, and elevated 
interest rates drive financial capital gains in turn.
Instead of an expansion in the supply of public goods that equalize opportunities 
and well-being, what we have seen is the commodification of all aspects of life, under 
the hegemony of the capital market (private insurance and credit for any sort of mis-
fortune). Only decommodification restricts the functioning of the financial market 
and its deleterious effects, especially in terms of the reproduction of inequalities. To 
substitute public goods with private provision is thus to restrict the scope of what 
ought to be decommodified; and this route will certainly not make us more equal.
Nor will it allow for a successful addressing of the problem of structural hetero-
geneity, which mirrors deficits in universalization. Fajnzylber’s declaration at the start 
of this article obliges us to reflect on the recent trajectories of Latin American govern-
ments that used social policy to incentivize market incorporation, scorning true social 
catching-up – something only possible when equity-promoting policies are truly a 
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priority on government agendas and within institutions, with a real effect on the dis-
tribution of social spending.
This article shows that the greatest advances of the decade of the return to growth 
in Latin America came in the labor market. The decoupling of well-being and in-
come or assets as parameters of true social protection remains incomplete, in part 
because social protection systems, despite some progress, remain equally incomplete 
and threatened by weak institutional frameworks.
The vulnerable are guaranteed a level of minimum income defined by extremely 
low poverty and indigence lines, while in terms of social services and basic rights 
(where supply and coverage remain deficient and insufficient), they are forced towards 
the market, thus reducing the already-clipped scope of the public sphere.
We consider Fanjzylber and Furtado’s line of argument penetrating and incontro-
vertible in its indication that both the spread of modern products and the generalization 
of consumption patterns on industrial goods, once a class differential, have little or no 
impact on the precarious nature of social relations and regional levels of inequality. What 
differentiates social protection systems in their classical form is precisely how they com-
bine income guarantees with the unconditional universalization of rights and access. It is 
no accident that greater consumption and market incorporation sans any commitment 
to the larger decommodification of services and the deindividualization of the right of 
access cannot overcome our profound and persistent heterogeneity. But this seems to be 
of little consequence to those who exalt mass consumer society in Latin America while 
failing to place us on a sustainable trajectory towards overcoming our asymmetries.
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